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The Experience of Being Diagnosed with a Psychiatric Disorder: Living the
Label
by Zelda G Knight and Bruce C Bradfield
Informed by the investigative thrust of phenomenological inquiry and the ‘phenomenology of
intersubjectivity’, the overarching aim of this article is to provide an accurate illumination of the
experience of being diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder, and thus being ‘a labelled individual’.  This
article is based on research that sought to understand the impact of the psychiatric label upon labelled
individuals interpersonal and intersubjective presence as experienced outside the psychiatric institution.
The principle question asked was:  “What is the experience of being a labelled individual in the world?”.
It was discovered that psychiatric labelling unfolds as a disconnection and dislocation from co-existence
with others.  Moreover, labelling had the effect of robbing such individuals of their subjectivity, rendering them
lonely, misunderstood and viewed as somehow defective, disabled and wrong
Introduction
The overarching aim of this article is to document the
experience of being labelled with a psychiatric
diagnosis or disorder such as schizophrenia or bi-
polar disorder.  The intention is to discover how such
labelling may or may not have an impact on to the
mutual presencing of self to other.  In this regard, the
primary questions asked were:  “What is the
experience of being a labelled individual in the
world?”,  “What does the label mean for the person
labelled, and how does the labelled individual
understand that meaning, and respond to that meaning
in his or her lived-world?”.  The conceptual
framework used is phenomenology, with particular
attention paid to the ‘phenomenology of
intersubjectivity’ and the construction of the so-called
‘diagnostic object’.
The anti-psychiatrists of the 1950s, 60s and 70s such
as Goffman (1968), Laing (1967, 1982), Rosenhan
(1992), and Szasz (1961, 1973) focussed their
energies upon the impact of the psychiatric
institution.  These writers aimed at a deconstruction
of the inhumanities which characterised the
functioning of the institution.  The essential thrust of
this article, based on qualitative research methods, is
to document the experiences of those labelled with a
psychiatric disorder who live outside  rather than
inside the psychiatric institution.
The psychiatric label emerges within the psychiatric
endeavour as an unequivocal description of the
individual’s mental state (Bradfield, 2001, 2003;
Kiesler, 2000).  This description effects diagnosed
individuals’ consciousness and their sense of self was
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disclosed as an experience of dehumanisation thereby
translating their consciousness into a ‘scientific fact’
(Bradfield, 2002, 2003; Goodwin & Guze, 1996).  In
this sense, the label eclipses personal identity.  In
rendering consciousness wholly definable from within
the confinement that is the label, labelled individuals
find they are only present to the world as a
schizophrenic or a bipolar and are unable to recreate
themselves beyond their diagnostic partition.  They
are thus dehumanised insofar as they have been
robbed of their potential for regeneration and
transcendence (Bradfield, 2002, 2003).
The phenomenology of intersubjectivity
The construct of intersubjectivity or the presencing of
self to other (Reeder, 1998) constitutes the
exploratory focus of this article.  Intersubjectivity
emerges within the lived-world as an a priori
imperative, operating as foundational in situating the
self in relation to others.  Intersubjectivity is disclosed
most basically as the relation of a subjectivity to the
world in and through which that subjectivity exists.  It
implies an interconnectedness of self, the world of
things and others.  “Intersubjectivity can be defined as
the  intersection of two or more subjectivities”
(Schulte, 2000, p. 531).
We now proceed with an explication of
intersubjectivity as it is grasped phenomenologically,
as a mode of being and as an existential potentiality.
Who are others-in-the-world?   What is their position
in relation to myself as a being-in-the-world?  As one
within the world how do I find myself amongst
others?  Is my presence in relation to others an
ontological imperative, or do I decide for myself
whether or not I will have relations with others?
Luijpen (1969) conceptualised intersubjectivity as an
existential imperative which brings the self into
existence as a self.  Luijpen asserts the notion that
being entirely exclusive of others is an existential
impossibility.
“No aspect of man’s being-man is what it is without
the ‘presence’ of other men in it.  The presence of
others in my existence implies that my being is a
being through others” (Luijpen, 1969, p.  261-2).
Luijpen’s account of the phenomenology of
intersubjectivity emerges as an existential imperative
in which all individuals exist necessarily through and
in relation to others.  As a self amongst other selves I
am brought into awareness of myself through my
awareness of my self-other relatedness.  To exist as a
self amongst others is to co-exist  (Luijpen, 1969).
My existence, grasped as the project of my being, is
at the same time the project of my world.  That which
I am in my existing and my becoming is meaningful
only through my relation to the world which houses
that becoming.  Existence, suggests Luijpen, unfolds
as authentic only if individuals find themselves
amongst others with whom they co-existence.  This
perception of self with other, in which two or more
subjectivities see themselves as belonging within a
shared world as co-existents, is given
phenomenologically as a mutual revelation of self to
other and other to self (Schulte, 2000).  This
reciprocal disclosure of selves unfolds as a “mutual
gaze” (Schulte, p.  536) indicating the mutual
implication of subject and world, in which both are
present to the other as indications of what the one is
in relation to the other.  At this intersubjective
meeting-place, self is present to world as a co-
revelation of likeness; and world meets self, echoing
what that self is for itself.
A core element of the phenomenology of
intersubjectivity is the simple fact of existential
companionship disclosed through mutual recognition
of self and other.   It is suggested that through the
likeness, self and other emerge as present to one
another in the mode of companionship.  In terms of
the exploration of intersubjectivity as it is disclosed in
the lebenswelt, companionship with an other unfolds
as a self-world-relatedness dialogue.  In this sense, I
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am enabled to conceive of myself only through the
world with which I, as a co-existing subjectivity,
share my being and my becoming. Conversely,
through my being in a social, cultural, historical and
temporal space, I bring that space into existence as a
world, occupied by, and co-created by myself and
others, with whom I share a likeness in being.
Luijpen describes this intersubjective partaking within
the world in terms of the relation of an independent
“I” to an independent “You”, both of whom
appropriate their own worlds individually, and yet
both of whom exist through the other in that
appropriation as companions within a lived-world.
The world in which I live is not a world which I can
know in isolation from those subjectivities with
whom I stay in co-existence.  I can only know my
world as an “our-world” and as a world which has
meaning for me through others.  And so, the world
can only have meaning through world-relatedness of
‘I’ and ‘You’, which emerges as a dialogue of self
and other, and is disclosed as an existential
imperative.
This notion of companionship, as articulated by
Luijpen, bares an interpretive resemblance to Buber’s
(1970) notion of the I-Thou relationship.  In Buber’s
system, ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ are posited as an
intersubjective co-creation in which both are brought
into a realisation of self and other through a reciprocal
recognition of the other.  In terms of companionship
as an existential theme within the phenomenology of
intersubjectivity, it can be seen how my meeting with
the other, and the relationship of acceptance and
likeness which characterises that meeting, amounts to
a co-creation of the world as a lived-world and as a
shared world.  My commonness emerges through
intersubjective experience as an appropriation of the
world of my lived-experience.  It is through the other
that I am brought into perception of that world as it is
for me.  And it is here that we are brought back to
Luijpen’s original statement that my being-in-the-
world is a being-through-others (Luijpen, 1969).  It is
through my being as a subject in relation to the world
which I interpret, and that world’s interrelation to me,
that I am brought into being through others in the
world - as a being-in-the-world-amongst-others.
Intersubjectivity and the likeness of being
The experience of individuals within their lived-world
of social occupation constitutes an important
consideration in the exploration of being-in-the-
world.  “To exist”, suggests Luijpen (1969, p.  261)
“is to co-exist”.  In terms of the phenomenological
unfolding of this co-existence, self and world are
established through an interpermeation; a flowing of
the one into the other, such that both are met in an
experiential revelation that is being-with-others
(Adams, 1999).
This potential for permeation of individuals within
their world, suggests Natanson (1974), arises out of a
functional reciprocation in which they are able to
experience themselves within the social collective.  I,
through my presence, typify the others experience of
self, and others, through their recognition of me and
their concurrent typification of my attributes, allows
me to apprehend my own likeness.  Kruger (1988)
echoes this hypothesis in his exploration of
Heidegger’s notion of the Mitsein.  Kruger examines
the notion of our co-habitation within a common
world in terms of our being-with-one-another.
Our world is a world which we share with others of
whom we have an originary knowledge of being in
the world in the same way as we are.  Being human
means being in relation to others (Kruger, 1988, p.
81).
Adams (1999) recapitulates this sentiment in his
examination of what he calls an ‘agency-in-
communion’.  In this sense, the self is grasped as an
active individuality, a self-initiating autonomy
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functioning within a collective and situated as one
within social existence.  Although there is no
intention here to hint at a transpersonal psychological
conception of the-individual-in-the-world, the
description of social occupation and co-existence as a
form of communion is useful insofar as it implies a
metaphoric sameness which unfolds as the foundation
of individual purpose and intentionality.
Ambiguity, isolation, and knowledge of other
minds
Thus far we have posited the notion of
intersubjectivity in terms of the emergence of self
through a reciprocal co-recognition of self and other.
Intersubjectivity, as an interconnectedness between
self and world, unfolds as an illumination of self
through the perceiving of the self in the other and in
the world.  It is thus that the self is brought into being
through the other.  It is now time to put a theoretical
spanner in the works.
Scheff (1973) expressed his understanding of the
disclosure of ambiguity within the intersubjective
space.  This ambiguity arises through the problem of
knowledge of other minds.  The actions of the other
are the route through which I gain knowledge of the
other but only as they are for me.  In this sense, I
cannot know the other fully.  I cannot know their
mind as they know it but only as I take it in my
framing of it.  And it is of course the same for the
other in their estimation of me.  This inability to know
other minds unfolds within the lived-world as the
cause of the misunderstanding and ambivalence
which shapes interpersonal existence (Scheff, 1973).
My knowledge of the other is just that, my
knowledge.  And it is by virtue of this disconnection
of awareness that I find myself isolated and
misunderstood in relation to the other.
In his recounting of the ambivalence which defines
this interpersonal situating of self and other, Scheff
has captured quite concretely the disconnection which
defines the location of one subjectivity in relation to
another.  That which I know of the other is only true
within the limits of my own understandings which are
confined to knowledge of things not of minds.  And
so, in knowing others I always and inevitably miss
them.
In the discussion of the results of the research
findings which follow, it shall be seen how this
comparison of Buber’s notion of the I-Thou
relationship and Sartre’s schematic construction of
being-for-others emerges as significant as a
framework for understanding interpersonal
relationships.  These opposing systems of
understanding shall be employed as a way of
exploring such relationships as these relationships are
experienced by individuals branded as manifesting a
specific mental illness.
In light of this exploration of the phenomenology of
intersubjectivity we now explore the notion of
alienation and loneliness as understood within an
existential  phenomenological  framework.
Existentialism, suggests Burston (1998) asserts that
despite different social, historical, cultural and
interpersonal situations, and differences in age,
gender and race, humans, simply by virtue of their
existence, partake in the same basic structure of
existence and of being-in-the-world.  Alienation, as a
“state or process whereby one becomes separated or
estranged from one’s original condition”, unfolds as
something inconsistent with the notion of the
evenness of being (Burston, 1998, p.  84).  Alienation
is explored here in relation to the experience of
loneliness and separateness from the world and from
others in the world (Olds & Schwartz, 2000).
Loneliness is here defined as the result of an inability
on the part of the self to communicate to the other.
The lonely self is understood here as one which feels
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that its way of being is seen by the other as
inadmissible, abnormal or defective (Sadler, 1978).
Lonely individuals are understood as those who are
unable to make themselves known to others.  They
are unable to convey that which constitutes their own
truth as that truth is lived by them.  They are
‘outsiders’.  In terms of loneliness as understood
within the field of mental health, it is seen to be
attached directly to the construction of notions of
normality and abnormality in terms of the individual’s
presentation of self within world.  The mentally ill
individual, the labelled individual, is present in the
world amongst others as one whose actions are
deviant, abnormal, and defective.  Whether this
emergence of the labelled individual as being
different impacts upon the experience of isolation or
separateness from the world will be explored later on.
Science and the construction of the diagnostic
object
The DSM-IV is formulated as an evidence-based
nosology, grounded in observations of perceptible
behaviours, signs and symptoms (Frances & Egger,
1999).  It manifests as an attempt to glean a global
description of the individual’s complaint which is
descriptive of all spheres within which that complaint
is disclosed, and is based in what can be objectively
known of that complaint.  Goodwin and Guze (1996)
suggest that diagnostic classification operates to allow
for communication of disorders across social, cultural
and geographical boundaries, and facilitates
prediction of the course of a particular psychiatric
syndrome.  Diagnosis is prognosis.  The system of
psychiatric diagnosis manifests an attempt to define
clinical entities and to outline the expected course of
mentally ill individuals’ symptomatic presentation
(Maxmen, 1980).  The disorders articulated in the
DSM manuals are understood as natural categories
and are thus considered to be rule-bound in their
manifestation.  The category is approached as a class
of entities or operations that are objectively real in the
world.  In this sense, the psychiatric diagnosis
emerges as a solid and objectively real system
describing a specific pattern of scientifically
knowable symptoms.
Thus we see the emergence of the medical model of
psychiatric intervention.  The medicalisation of
psychiatry has been established as a system in which
psychiatric disorders are constructed as describable
immutable entities which are biological deviations
(Keisler, 2000;  Szasz, 2000).  Psychiatry has
therefore been translated into a treatment based in the
application of modern biology and psychiatric
disorders, and has thus come to be evaluated from
within this mode of inspection.  It is through this
understanding of mental illness as related to a
physiological aetiology that the psychiatrist, operating
as scientist of the ‘diseased soul’ (Van den Berg,
1972), is enabled to categorically state a diagnosis.
The psychiatric diagnosis, when approached as an
intervention in direct relation to human
consciousness, appears to emerge as problematic in
terms of its tendency towards reductionism and the
reification of subjectivity (Ross & Pam, 1995).
Psychiatry, as it has emerged in contemporary
medicine, bypasses the subjectivity which it attempts
to treat.  In its function as a biological science,
psychiatry circumvents those fundamentally human
elements of existence which shape our being-in-the-
world as social beings (Bradfield, 2002, 2003).  This
work aims to explore the disclosure of the diagnosis
in the lived-world of the individual, and it is towards
such an evaluation of the diagnosis that this article’s
direction turns.
As has been stated, mental disorders are understood
from within the scientific paradigm as  discernible
entities born out of a physiological deviation in the
individual (Kiesler, 2000).  Bradfield (2002, 2003)
articulates the notion that this positing of mental
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illness as physiological in its causation amounts to the
construction of the mental illness as a thing, separate
and measurable.  The psychogenesis of mental illness
is therefore conceptualised as a biogenesis; the illness
is perceived as occupying a physical space.  Medard
Boss (1979) explored the implications of the scientific
attitude in relation to mental illness as being causally
linked with biological deviation.  Boss’s
phenomenological psychology pronounces a critique
of the psychiatric endeavour as being an incomplete
attempt at capturing human consciousness.  Boss
bases his critique on his exploration of the natural
scientific attitude, a perspective which, he maintains,
is disconnected from the mode of human existence.
Scientific methodology is reliant upon the notion of
spatiality.  The scientific objective can be seen as one
which must secure the concept of spatiality so as to
find a basis for its measurements and deductions: the
scientific object is rendered calculable insofar as it
can be found in a world of discrete physical
manifestations, and its location, as a distinct entity,
can be judged in terms of its spatial relation to other
entities.  It is towards an evaluation of this reduction,
as it impacts upon the humanness of the psychiatric
endeavour, that Boss’s critique is aimed.
The reduction of space, suggests Boss (1979), is
achieved through emptying regions of space and
through constructing space as a void.  As seen
through the scientific gaze, space is that unblemished
gap which lies between two points and allows for a
calculation of those two points in relation to one
another.  This notion of the depletion of regions of
space, says Boss (1979) has been transferred onto the
psychological sciences.  Insofar as the aim of this
article is to explore the subjective impact of the
diagnosis on the diagnosed individual, this
transference must be evaluated in terms whether it
impacts upon the individual’s experience.  How can it
be said that such spatiality as defines the evaluation of
inanimate objects can be applied to the appraisal of
peoples being-in-the-world?  As an intentional
consciousness, how can humanity be considered
calculable in terms of spatiality?
Karlsson (1992, p. 405) extends Boss’s argument,
exploring the spatiality of the “psychological unit”.
The psychological unit is seen within psychological
science through the lens of what he terms eliminative
materialism.  This theoretical initiative amounts to the
reduction of psychology to the science of neurology
and to the sedimentation of psychological
phenomena.  In terms of the manifestation of this
reduction within scientific psychological practice, we
see the diminishment of subjective experience to a
physiological description (Karlsson, 1992).  This
diminishment of subjective meaning within scientific
psychological practice finds its origin in mainstream
psychology’s subscription to the premises of the
natural-scientific framework.  And is it this notion of
spatiality that has converted the psychiatric sciences
from the study of the human being into the scientific
evaluation of a person as an embodied thing,
determined by a neurophysiological causal process
(Bradfield, 2002).  “Man-as-object becomes the focus
of study, and not man as a person.” (Giorgi, 1970, p.
113).
Method
Phenomenological enquiry amounts to a focus on the
way in which experience is given directly through the
participants expression, prior to the interpretation of
those expressions.  In this sense, the
phenomenological question is focused upon eliciting
the life-world.  Within phenomenological research the
lebenswelt is awarded explorative primacy and it is
towards an uncovering and understanding of meaning,
as revealed within the lebenswelt ,  that
phenomenology directs its inquiry (Giorgi, 1975).  As
indicated in the introduction, the principle question
asked is:  “What is the experience of being a labelled
individual in the world?”.  There were  other related
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questions such as  “What does the label mean for the
person labelled, and how does the labelled individual
understand that meaning, and respond to that meaning
in his or her lived- world?”  Most importantly within
the context of the research on which this article is
based, how does the labelled individual’s
understanding of the label impact upon his or her
experience of self in relation to others?  What is
presented below are the results of the findings only
which form the discussion.  This means that although
no protocols are included, such protocols are
available on request.
Data was collected using semi-structured interviews
(Kvale, 1996).  Participants were simply asked to tell
their own story in their own words.  Interviews lasted
an average of fifty minutes, and were tape recorded
and transcribed verbatim.
Grounded theory, as formulated within the qualitative
research tradition, was chosen as the method most
suited to the purposes of this study.  Through a series
of steps or stages, grounded theory aims to render
intelligible the experiences of an individual subject
from within the situation of that subject’s experiential
world (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  Briefly, these steps
involve a sequential process of ‘unpacking’ in which
the text is subdivided into smaller units of analysis
known as codes.  Such codes are explored for the
relationships existing between them.  This
comparison of codes, known as ‘constant
comparison’, pervades the analytic process (Strauss &
Corbin, 1998).  Constant comparison manifests in
three different coding procedures: ‘open coding’,
‘axial coding’ and ‘selective coding’ (Strauss &
Corbin, 1998) all of which aim to progressively bring
meaning to the data.  The next stage, that of
association, involves the construction of models of
understanding and is done with reference to the
context within which the text is located (Terre
Blanche & Kelly, 1999).  At this point in the
investigative process, a system of core codes emerge,
a lucid presentation of the relationships and
interactions between those codes, and a system of
theoretical propositions in explication of these
interconnections.  It is through this conceptual
creation of codes and their interrelations that
integrative diagramming, which is the schematic
representation of codes and sub-codes, is made
possible.  The final analytic motion in grounded
theory is that of translating the schematic into the
narrative, converting diagram into story (Strauss &
Corbin, 1998).  This narrative account unfolds as the
transfiguration of conceptual abstractions thereby
returning to the subjective telling of the participant’s
situation.  The narrative emerges as a description of
the tensions existing in relation to the codes and sub-
codes, and expresses these tensions as they are
present within the lived-world of the participant.  It is
through such a narrative account that the theory is
validated and the data grounded.
Three English-speaking adult participants (two
women and one man) were selected based on the
following criteria: Participants had been informed of
their having a specific psychiatric diagnosis and that
they had been diagnosed at least one year prior to the
time of the interview as it was considered relevant
insofar as this research aimed at an elicitation of the
lived-experience of the diagnosis.  At the time of the
interviews they were not in a mental institution and
had not been in one in the previous 12 months.  It is
towards a phenomenological dissection of the
diagnostic label only and not the effect of
institutionalisation, that this work is aimed.  It was
decided that participants must have been informed of
their diagnosis by a psychiatrist.  This requirement
was considered important insofar as the function of
psychiatry as a biomedical endeavour is a significant
consideration within this study.  Being diagnosed by a
psychiatrist would therefore be more appropriate in
terms of the focus of the study.  The culture or sex of
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participants was not considered important in terms of
the results of the study.  As long as the individual was
diagnosed according to the Western system of
psychiatric classification the individual’s cultural
background did not factor in.
The first participant was a woman in her early
twenties and working as a musician.  She had been
diagnosed with generalized anxiety disorder, social
phobia, bipolar phase 1, as well as borderline
personality disorder.  She  stated that borderline
personality disorder and bipolar mood disorder “were
the ones that stuck”.  The second (married) woman
participant was in her late twenties and unemployed.
She had been diagnosed with bipolar mood disorder.
The third participant was a man in his early thirties
and a student at university.  He was initially
diagnosed with schizophrenia. This diagnosis was
changed thereafter to bipolar mood disorder.
Discussion
This section investigates the elicitation of the
participants lived-world by relating what has been
presented to an understanding of being-in-the-world,
being-diagnosed, and being-with-others in the world.
As a reminder, what is presented below are the results
of the findings only which form the discussion.
The label embodied
One of the most notable reactions, in terms of the
present consideration of psychiatry as a bio-science,
was the idea that the diagnosis turns the diagnosed
individual into basically just an organism.  Insofar as
the diagnosis is given as a biological description of a
psychological state, this offering is felt by the
individual as a translation of that state from
something mental, emotional and subjective, into
something physiological. It becomes a “sickness”.
And insofar as this sickness is understood as
neurophysiologically based, it renders the individual
who has such a sickness “chemically controlled” by
that sickness.  The notion that one’s emotional state
and one’s subjectivity could be described as being
constituted by an abnormality in one’s chemical
constitution was felt as an “insult” which “robbed”
the individuals of their emotional reactions of
sincerity and validity.  One participant said:
“What you’re feeling, is it sincere or not?  Because an
emotion as opposed to a chemical is quite a different
thing.  When feelings becomes labels it becomes
blurred and dangerous.”
This expression reveals an obvious tension in relation
to the nature of psychiatric description.  The disorder
becomes a ‘disability’ which is grasped as a ‘physical
disability’ by both the psychiatrist and the diagnosed
individual.
The exploration, as presented earlier, of Medard
Boss’ formulation of spatiality as a function of
science and psychiatry, also emerged as central to the
understanding of the participants’ revelations.  Such
individuals appear to experience a sense of the label
as being present physically within them, as being a
physical disability.  The label begins to be understood
in this way as a space-occupying disease entity.  Most
importantly, in terms of the notion of the spatiality of
the disease entity, is the subjective experience of
being ‘displaced’ by the label which now comes to
inhabit that space.  One participant remarked:
“…  I’m not a person, but a chemically controlled one
of many ….  Where is the space for one violinist?
The artist; The sensuous creature?   There is none –
can’t you see? The space is taken up?”
This labelled individual (one of the women) appears
to feel that part of her self is replaced by the diagnosis
which functions as a new and more solidified
description of her self.  The space is taken up by a
label which becomes internalised within the
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individual, and which is understood as a description
of who or what that individual is.
Intentional consciousness and the label
The understanding of consciousness – as expressed
above - is central to the consideration of the impact of
the diagnosis on the individual.  The diagnosis
emerges as a description of a mental, emotional and
behavioural state which is offered simultaneously as a
description of a physiological abnormality.  As a
description of a mental state, the diagnosis emerges
also as a description of consciousness.  It is posited
herein that the diagnosis, as a description of an
individual, emerges as a framework from within
which that consciousness can be explicated, evaluated
and understood (Bradfield, 2002).  One participant
commented:
“To look in a book and see, ‘These are eight or ten
things which your general borderline personality will
have.’ And oh, tick, tick, tick, tick, tick … There I am
on that page.”
Insofar as the consciousness of the labelled individual
is revealed as a consciousness described and judged,
that consciousness emerges as something which is not
clear.  The consciousness of the labelled individual is
disclosed in the world precisely as ‘the consciousness
of the labelled individual’.  This means that the
consistency that is consciousness is somehow
‘channelled’ or controlled.
Participants revealed the experience of a sense of
permanence and constancy in relation to the
emergence of the diagnosis.  This apprehension of
permanence was related to a subjective reaction to the
diagnosis in which it was felt that the diagnosis
occupied a definite ‘space’ in relation to the
individual and that individual’s consciousness.  There
is a sense that a certain part of the self is displaced by
the label as it becomes concretised within the
individual’s consciousness.    One participant
explained:
“Everything became a part of my condition.   I no
longer had feelings, but moods and condition; and I
was related to in that way.  And then I become a
condition. …  It sort of takes you out of yourself as a
human being into sort of like an organism.”
Insofar as the diagnosis was seen to emerge within
consciousness as a real and tangible occupant of
consciousness, it seems that the individual who ‘lives
the diagnosis’ is ‘channelled’ by the delineation that
is the diagnosis.  In this sense, the individual lives as a
bipolar or as a borderline.  This statement echoes the
experience, as obtained from the data, of having a part
of oneself displaced by the label.  The diagnosis
becomes “stuck” to the individual whose
consciousness it describes.  The diagnosis, for the
diagnosed individual, becomes “permanent”, “just
like diabetes”, “a sickness”, “a mental illness full
stop”, and something that you must “live with until
you die”.  But how can consciousness, as that which
the diagnosis describes, be understood as such?  Can
consciousness be delineated by diagnostic science?  If
so, how does this delineation impact on the
experience of the diagnosed individual?
On the finding of self in world: An exploration of
being-with-others
The label is experienced as something internal to the
individual and as something which the individual
comes to “embody”.  Understood as such, the label is
given as the situation from within which such
individuals experience their world and as an
intentional being in that world.  One participant
revealed:
“You want to know what you embody, and what you
embody is a disorder …  so then, now I’m a bipolar.
Having internalised them (the labels), indulged them,
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played with them, I am not sure I can rid myself of
these labels.  Although I do not really believe in
labelling, I live it every day.  It’s like learning to live
again.  But this time, with a disorder.”
In terms of the labeled individual’s existence-in-
relation-to-others, the position of the labelled self in
relation to the unlabelled other is one defined by a
sense of wrongness, abnormality, defectiveness and
difference.   In that place where individuals find
themselves with and amongst others, in that meeting
of self and other, labelled individuals seem to
experience a strong sense of their unlikeness and
dissimilarity as a result of being labelled.  One
participant announced:
“It’s like there’s something wrong.  And what’s
wrong?  I’m wrong.  It’s that sort of feeling ... I feel
like a bit of an odd-ball.”
It can therefore be seen that the lebenswelt of the
labelled individual is one defined by being present to
others in terms of being ‘unlike’ the other.  The
experience of “being-wrong” as it relates to difference
and dissimilarity is explored in this work through the
framework of two interpretive foci.  Firstly, we shall
appraise the participants experience of difference and
unlikeness in terms of the notion of typification, as
formulated by Natanson (1974) and the notion of the
complementary identity, as formulated by Sartre
(1943)  and represented earlier.
These labelled participants, in experiencing
themselves as “different”,  “abnormal”, and “wrong”
in their “disordered” self appears to have no
experience of being typified in their being-with-
others.  There is no sense in which such individuals
find their likeness in the other.  Labelled individuals
are present to others in the world as one who is not-
like those around them.  In this sense, there appears to
be a subjective experience of meeting the other as one
who is “not-like-me”.  Luijpen (1969) explored the
notion of intersubjectivity in terms of the
apprehension of likeness in self and other and it is
precisely this apprehension which does not seem to
emerge in the labelled individual.  One participant
disclosed:
“It makes me feel a bit funny sometimes.  Like I feel
separate from the world.  Like I feel different.”
How can this awareness of difference from the other
be understood?  In answering this question we would
like to return the reader to the exploration of
intersubjectivity.  According to the theoretically
diverse and yet similar propositions of such thinkers
as Buber (1970), Kruger (1988), Luijpen (1969) and
Schulte (2000), the experience of intersubjectivity is
grounded to a large extent in the mutual revelation of
self to other and other to self, such that both are
disclosed through that meeting.  This reciprocal
illumination of both self and other, suggests Schulte
(2000), emerges as a mutual gaze in which subject
and world are present to each other as an image or
indication of what the other is for her or himself.
Von Eckartsberg (1989) explored the intersubjective
relationship in terms of the value which this
recognition of likeness and commonness holds for
such a relationship.  Von Eckartsberg emphasized the
importance of being present to an other within a
common subjective space; realizing the interpersonal
similarities which define that space, and the
correspondence and mutuality which characterizes
and enriches that space.  This communion, as it has
been suggested, emerges through the apprehension of
likeness in the other; and it is precisely this
recognition of likeness which is the birthplace of
value and meaning in interpersonal.
Through the evaluation of the data collected, the
participants experienced a sense of being-in-the-world
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as one who is fundamentally different from others in
that world.  One participant confessed:
“I feel different.   Like a bit of an odd-ball maybe.
I’ve got limitations that are different from other
peoples.”
As mentioned above, intersubjectivity is defined as
the relation of a subjectivity to the world in which
that subjectivity exists; and is the interconnectedness
of self and world in which being-in-the-world
establishes itself in relation to the world and to other
selves (Schulte, 2000).  Fundamental to this notion of
the betweenness of human existence in which self and
world are established in that space which connects
them, is the idea that meaning is found and created in
that meeting place (Luijpen, 1969;  Schulte, 2000).  In
light of this, what is the situation of the labelled
individual in terms of his or her existence as a being-
with others?  It is precisely the situation described
above, that of the experience of dissimilarity,
unlikeness and separateness, which appears to define
this situation.
One participant acknowledged:
“I mean what is a disorder.  It’s something that’s
wrong.  Something that’s not right.”
This experience of difference emerged in relation to
being diagnosed with a psychiatric illness.  Another
participant admitted:
“Being bipolar, having a diagnosis, having a
psychiatric illness, having a disability.  It makes you
different from other so-called normal people.”
The participants experienced a commonality in the
degree of anxiety at the possibility of being rejected
by others.  For the two of the participants their
response to this was to give others a full explanation
of the nature of their illness so as to “explain” why
they are “different”.  This tendency to explain the
illness emerged as a presentation of the self through
the diagnostic description such that the self came to
be understood through the terms of the diagnosis.
The participants seemed to want others who are not
diagnosed as mentally ill to accept them as they are
“with this difference.”  One participant responded:
“Sometimes I’m trying to make friends and then I
might bring it up because I want to be accepted for
who I am with this difference.  But other people may
say ‘Oh, that’s weird.  You’re a weirdo.’  I feel the
need to explain to people because it helps them to
understand me better.”
It is here that we find a connection with the
interpersonal theories of Sartre and Buber.  It is
suggested in this work that the experiences of the
participants, in terms of their existence in relation to
others who are not labelled, is effected by the
difference constructed through the positioning of
labelled individuals in relation to those who are not-
labelled.  Labelled individuals experience their label
as a signification of something permanent, immutable
and concrete.  And so it is that participants came to
“embody” that which is experienced as “different”,
“wrong”, and “abnormal”.  More importantly is the
notion that the individual is present to the other as a
labelled-individual-in-relation-to-a-non-labelled-
individual.
Participants felt a compulsion to present themselves
to the other through the delineations of their own
label.  This need arose as a result of a total acceptance
of the label and of what the label represents as a
clinical entity.  The participants accepted the ‘truth’
which the label held as a description of themselves
and presented themselves to others as a living
embodiment of that description.  They refused to
allow that they could be understood entirely in terms
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of the label and felt “insulted” at the notion that the
label was understood as a full description of a
definable clinical disease entity.  This disease entity
could be understood as a complete account of the
individual’s neurophysiological state and of the
individual’s resultant behavioural deviations.  And
this systematized perception of the individual’s being-
in-the-world was defined by an understanding of the
permanence and singularity that was his or her
diagnosis.
It is proposed here that this presentation of the
labelled individual to others who are not labelled
unfolds within the interpersonal realm as an
objectivisation of the labelled individual as a being-
in-the-world.  The individual comes to inhabit the
label.  Such individuals come to exist in relation to
the other as being-labelled.  As it appeared through
the data, this inhabitation of the label arises as a result
of two things.  Either the expectation on the part of
the other that labelled individuals will behave in
direct accordance with the prescriptions of the label,
or as a result of labelled individuals presenting
themselves to the other as being-labelled.  In both
instances the labelled participants appeared to operate
within the context of interpersonal relationships as the
one who is labelled, and who behaves in certain
concretely defined ways, as defined by the label.
Elemental to this idea of the objectivisation of the
labelled individual is the notion of observation and
the presence of an external gaze.  All labelled
participants experienced a sense of being interpreted
or read by others in terms of the other’s expectation
of what and how labelled individuals behaviour
should be.  This experience emerged as an awareness
on the part of the labelled individuals of an external
gaze which was focused upon them.  One participant
retorted:
“Only when I’m by myself can I just sort of ‘be’.
They (other people) think if you’ve got a problem like
that you must be wacky or in an institution of
something.”
It can thus be seen how the individual labelled with a
specific diagnosis comes to be seen as an objectifiable
presence in relation to others.  The individual
becomes, for the other, a living embodiment of a
“condition” or a “disability” or “symptom”.  The
diagnosis comes to define how the diagnosed
individual is understood by others with whom that
individual interacts.  In this sense, the individual
comes to be understood through his or her diagnosis
in “concrete”,  “permanent” and “object-like” terms.
This way of perceiving labelled individuals also
manifested as an internal gaze in which labelled
individuals were seen to be very watchful of
themselves, essentially monitoring the course of
symptoms which belong to the diagnosis.  One
participant mentioned:
“I have been taught to be aware of every shifting
mood and change.  Anticipation and judgement of
mood and behaviour is not natural and is not allowing
one to live freely; but externally, always out of
oneself, like an observer.”
Buber’s (1970) notion of the I-Thou relationship is
defined by a confirmation of a mutual and reciprocal
acceptance of the likeness and dissimilarity of the
other in relation to the self.  As mentioned earlier,
Buber does not suggest that all interhuman
relatedness is characterized by this ideal.  He
maintains that the objectification of the self, of which
Sartre(1943) speaks, can be overcome through the
meeting of self and other in a dialogical relationship
defined by acceptance, confirmation of unlikeness,
and validation of difference.  This interhuman space
is understood in stark opposition to Sartre’s
formulation of being-for-others.  It is  suggested here
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that these two systems can be understood as operating
in terms of a dialectic in which both come to be
defined by a relative degree of knowledge of other
minds.  It is suggested that the interpersonal realm,
the realm of being-with-others, is affected by the
degree to which both self and other are able to enter
into one another, to interpenetrate, and therefore gain
an more complete understanding of the other and of
the self.  In relationships defined by acceptance,
confirmation and justification of similarity and
unlikeness, it appears that both self and other are able
to realize this mutual understanding (Von
Eckartsberg, 1989).
In light of this, how can the relationship of the
labelled individual to the other be understood?  It
appears that these labelled individuals, in
experiencing themselves in relation to the other as
being “different”, “weird”, “abnormal”, and “wrong”
did not experience any degree of confirmation and
validation by the other.  They feel “stuck” in their
wrongness and their difference and feel that they are
defined by their  labels in terms of others
interpretations of them as labelled individuals.  These
labelled individuals appear repulsed by this
experience of being stuck to their label, and being
stuck to others interpretations of them as being-
labelled.  These labelled individuals therefore appear
to exist amongst others as a being-for-others who are
stuck in their be-ing through the others interpretations
of them as labelled (Karlsson, 1992).  The label is
experienced by the participants as being permanent,
concrete and immutable, and it appears that this sense
of permanence and object-ness finds its way into
these labelled individuals’ world through their
interactions and relationships with others.
Labelling and the phenomenology of being-lonely
One element of the labelled individual’s experience of
being-in-the-world and being-with others as one who
is labelled which has not yet been explored is the
experience of isolation and separateness.  Participants
expressed a sense of loneliness in relation to their
experience of being labelled.
“I generally don’t see myself as part of any whole
thing, like any sort of community or whatever I’m
supposed to be part of.”
“I feel lonely … I feel isolated.  They don’t have the
sickness.”
 “I feel a sense of isolation from the world.  Having a
disability I feel a bit on the sidelines.  I feel a bit
different from other people.”
The experience of isolation and loneliness is a
problem most often encountered by health
professionals but is one to which insufficient attention
has been devoted.  The sense of alienation and
separation which emerged through the data was
disclosed both as an alienation from self and an
alienation from the other.  Burston (1998) suggests
that these two kinds of alienation are tightly bound to
one another.  As was stated earlier, loneliness is the
subjective result of an inability on the part of the self
to convey itself to the other.  The lonely self, in this
sense, is fundamentally misunderstood (Sadler, 1978).
This experience of being misinterpreted, of being
perceived as a diagnosed individual and therefore
incompletely understood, emerged through the data.
One participant reported:
“People may not understand or accept me.  It’s
something that other people don’t have.”
The sense on the part of these labelled individuals
was that “people don’t really know anything about
these labels”, as one of the participant’s put it,
contributes to the experience of being alone with
one’s condition.  Of course, this experience of
loneliness seems to come to the fore with individuals
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who live beyond the institution and with others who
are not labelled.  It was seen that the close
juxtaposition of the labelled individual with others
who are not labelled interferes with the labelled
individual’s capacity to relate to others on a simple
social level.  One participant recounted:
“I feel isolated because I never actually talk to people
that has got that.  They don’t have the sickness.  I feel
isolated because I feel they don’t understand.”
And so it seems that there is an evident connection
between these three labelled individuals perception of
their being misunderstood by the unlabelled
individual, and the labelled individuals experience of
loneliness, isolation, and disconnection.  This
experience of loneliness can be understood in terms
of the exploration of the phenomenology of
loneliness, as presented earlier in this article.  Sadler
(1978) relates the experience of loneliness to the
inability to convey oneself as one is to the other.
Individuals, in this sense, find that they are
fundamentally misunderstood and misinterpreted.
This conception of loneliness implies a construction
of normality and abnormality in terms of an
individual’s presentation of self to other.  In this
sense, these labelled individuals experience that
which they are as being fundamentally abnormal,
wrong, and inadmissible.  The result of this is a
profound sense of loneliness, separation and
disconnection.  In their difference, they feel that they
are isolated through their inability to convey to the
other that which constitutes themselves.   They cannot
be understood, penetrated, fathomed.  They are
labelled, and in the stuckness and concretisation
which that label implies, they remain mis-perceived
and incompletely known.  They are  estranged.  In
their relations to others they appears to be alone,
detached, and isolated.  In their being-different they
find that they are stuck.  They are stuck to their label;
to their wrongness; to their disconnection.
 The notion of being isolated through the inability to
know other minds was documented earlier.  It was
suggested that although we may know the other
through our interpretations of their actions we can
never really know them (Scheff, 1973).  This inability
to know other minds emerges within our experience
as the origin of misunderstanding and ambivalence in
our interpersonal relationships.  Knowledge of the
other, and therefore an increased association and
connectedness with the other, arises through close
interpersonal relationships, as defined here through
the structure of the Buberian I-Thou presencing.  Now
if we consider this position in relation to the
experiences of the labelled individual, it appears that
the sense of alienation, isolation and disconnection is
worsened through being labelled.  The label, as has
been seen, is something which can only be truly
known from within the lived-experience of the
labelled individual.  One participant related:
“People don’t really know anything about these labels
anyway ....  It feels as if our friends got fewer and
fewer because they don’t know anything about the
sickness ....  I feel the need to explain to people
because it helps them understand me better.”
This labelled individual appears to be fundamentally
unknown, misunderstood, and mysterious.  And it is
as a result of this that the labelled individual’s
experience of disconnection from the world, and from
the other, is consolidated.
It is suggested that the loneliness and disconnection
from the other can be understood as emerging in
connection with the position of asymmetrical
relatedness (Fromm, 1991) which defines the
relationship between the labelled individual and the
one not-labelled.  This pattern of relatedness between
self and other, suggests Fromm, puts the one whose
subjectivity is denied in a position of separateness,
depletion and isolation.  As can be seen through the
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data, this isolation and separateness defines the
relationship between the labelled individual and the
other.  The labelled individual is grasped as a
“condition”, a “disorder”, and is thus incorrectly and
incompletely grasped.  He or she is misunderstood,
and detached from others through their
misunderstanding.  In terms of the exploration of the
impact of the diagnosis on the individual’s experience
of being-with-others it appears we have a problem.
The participants experienced themselves as being
misunderstood by others and insofar as they are
understood only in terms of their label.  This resulted
in a strong sense of loneliness, detachment, isolation
and disconnection.  The relationship of the labelled
individuals to others who are not labelled therefore
emerged as an asymmetrical relationship in which the
labelled individuals full subjectivity are disallowed,
and they are understood only in terms of their label.
They are therefore misunderstood and lonely.
Removed.  Enclosed within their diagnosis.  They are
the outsiders.
Conclusion
The fact that no significant amount of research into
the subjective impact of the psychiatric label beyond
the mental institution has been conducted was a
significant reason for choosing such a research
endeavour as this one.
Several analytic codes emerged in terms of the
participants experience of their diagnosis.  Among
these were the following:
1) The experience of being wrong, different and
abnormal was seen as central to the experience of
being labelled as mentally ill.  This experience of
being “unlike” other unlabelled individuals was the
core code with which all other codes interacted;
2) The diagnosis was experienced by the labelled
individual as something permanent and fixed
within the lived-world of the individual.  The
label, as an immutable fixture within the
participants lives, therefore appeared to “take up
space” in a literal sense within the their daily life.
As a permanent ‘thing’, and as something which
in its manifestation is unchanging, the label
therefore appeared to exist in relation to the
individual as a concrete presence in the life of
that individual.  In terms of the impact of the
label on the participants within their daily
interpersonal functioning, it appeared that the
participants, to a certain degree, felt the need to
present themselves in terms of their diagnoses so
that they could be “understood” by others.  The
one woman participant did this by adopting the
role of the bipolar or the borderline.  She “played
the part”.  The other two participants felt the need
to explain themselves to others in terms of their
labels so that others would not be put off by the
fact that they are mentally ill.  They did this so as
to avoid rejection on the part of the other.  It is
thus that the participants presented themselves to
others as “labelled individuals”;
3) The experience of being-labelled was also
characterised by an internal and an external
monitoring of the individual as someone
manifesting a specific diagnosis.  In this sense
the individual monitors his or her behaviour from
within the parameters of the specific diagnosis.
The individual evaluates, judges and inspects his
or her behaviour.   The same woman participant
spoke of being her own “objective observer”.
This internal monitoring emerged as something
particularly unpleasant and unnecessary for her.
The participants also expressed the notion that
their behaviour is watched by others; constantly
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monitored in terms of the others’ expectations of
how they should behave as labelled individuals;
4) The experience of being misunderstood by
others was also pivotal to the participants
experience of their illness.  The notion that
“nobody really knows anything about these
illnesses”, and the felt necessity to “explain” to
others so that they may understand, were
expressed throughout the interviews.  The
participants therefore experienced a sense of
being detached from others through being
misinterpreted and misunderstood by the other.
5) The experience of being wrong and being
different from the other, the experience of having
to explain oneself to the other so as to avoid
rejection and so as to be understood by the other,
the experience of being misread and
misinterpreted by the other in terms of the
confines of the diagnosis, were seen as central to
the participants experience of their  label.  And
the effect of such experiences, as has been
shown, is a sense of loneliness, detachment, and
disconnection from others and from being-with-
others.  The existence of the labelled individual is
a lonely existence.  A dislocated existence.  An
estranged existence.
Finalé:
The relationship of the labelled individuals to
other individuals was read in terms of Jean-Paul
Sartre’s construction of being-for-others; Martin
Buber’s construction of the I-thou relationship;
and Erich Fromm’s notion of the asymmetrical
relationship.  It was seen that the participants, in
terms of their being-labelled, exist in relation to
others as an object for the other’s interpretation.
The label is present as an object within the
individual’s subjectivity.  That individual is
understood and related to by the other in terms of
the diagnostic object, and the individual’s
subjectivity is devaluated through his or her
being understood and related to only in terms of
the diagnostic object.  The individual becomes
the diagnosis, the condition, the disorder.  It is in
this sense that the labelled individual exists in
relation to the other in the mode of a being-in-
itself, a being-in-the-mode-of-an-object.  And it
is thus that the individual, in relation to others, is
robbed of his or her subjectivity
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